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PRIVATIZATION IN OLIGOPOLY: THE IMPACT OF THE 
SHADOW COST OF PUBLIC FUNDS
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The aim of this paper is to investigate the welfare effect of privatization in oligopoly 
when the government takes into account the distortionary effect of raising funds by  taxation 
(shadow cost of public funds). We analyze the impact of the change in ownership  not only on 
the objective function of the firms, but also on the timing of competition by endogenizing the 
determination of simultaneous (Nash-Cournot) versus sequential (Stackelberg) games. We 
show that, absent efficiency gains, privatization never increases welfare. Moreover, even 
when large efficiency gains are realized, an inefficient public firm may be preferred. 
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21  Introduction
In the last decades of the XX century a process of liberalization and/or privatization 
occurred in most of the industrialized countries and nowadays public utilities are generally no 
longer run by public monopolies. The motivations for this program were essentially linked to 
the general perception of poor performance of public monopolies and to the idea that entry of 
private subjects could enhance efficiency. For example, during the nineties, in Italy, in France 
and in UK, as well as in many  EU countries, the public incumbent faced the entry  of private 
competitors in many  communication services. The same occurred in the production of 
electricity, in gas retailing and more recently in some postal services. In the same years, 
national (public) airlines started competing with private or foreign ones in the domestic 
markets. Moreover, examples of public monopolies that became mixed oligopoly can be 
found in a broad range of industries including railways, steel and overnight-delivery 
industries, as well as services including banking, home loans, health care, life insurance, 
hospitals, broadcasting, and education. In these cases, instead of regulating a privatized 
monopoly, governments decided to enforce a facility-based competitions in order to achieve a 
so-called dynamic efficiency.1
Our investigation starts downward the liberalization process of a public monopoly, 
and the aim of the present work is to build a theoretical model for the analysis of the welfare 
effect of privatization in oligopoly. Following the literature on industrial organization, a 
market where a public welfare-maximizing firm competes against private profit-maximizing 
firms is denoted by mixed oligopoly. By privatization we mean a transfer of property  rights 
from the government to domestic private investors. This translates into a change in the 
objective function of the firm from welfare to profit maximization and a transfer of money 
from the investors to the government. Since we mainly refer to public utility markets open to 
competition, we consider a mixed duopoly in which production is characterized by  increasing 
returns to scale (with fixed and constant marginal costs) and we assume that the public firm is 
typically less efficient  than its private competitor.2 We analyze the effect of privatization on 
welfare comparing the equilibrium outcomes before and after privatization. Even though no 
dynamic effect is explicitly  analyzed, we consider both the case in which the privatized firm 
remains productively inefficient, and the case where privatization leads to a full recovery of 
the efficiency.
The first  novel contribution of this paper is represented by the introduction of the 
shadow cost of public funds in the objective function of the public firm. That is, we assume 
1 For deeper viewpoints on the role played by facility-based competition in EU and US Telecommunications 
liberalization and regulation processes see Taschdjian (1997) and Stehmann and Borthwick (1994).
2 Differently from Cremer et al. (1989), the higher production cost of the public firm is not a neutral transfer 
from firm to workers belonging to the same economy but, as an X-inefficiency, it reduces any utilitarian measure 
of welfare.
3that the public firm is required to take into account the distortionary  effect of the taxes that 
are needed to cover its deficit and, in general, public expenditures. In fact, absent lump-sum 
tax instruments, if government raises 1 Euro from taxation, society pays 
€ 
1+ λ( )  Euros. 
Coherently, public profits, when positive, avoid an equivalent public transfer, reducing 
distortionary taxes.3  As initially  analyzed in Meade (1944) and exploited in Laffont and 
Tirole (1986, 1993), this approach has been used to characterize public monopolies running a 
deficit and, more generally, regulated markets. Here we apply the same analysis to a public 
firm competing in a duopoly and to the effects of privatization, given that getting money for 
reducing public debt or distortionary taxes is often a complementary  target of privatization. 
The main consequence is that, taking into account the shadow cost of public funds, the public 
firm puts more weight on its own profits and, at least partially, it  mimics the behavior of a 
private firm.
The second contribution of this work is that we consider the effect of privatization on 
the timing of competition by endogenizing the determination of simultaneous (Nash-Cournot) 
versus sequential (Stackelberg) games. That is, the structure of the game is not assumed a 
priori, but it is the result of preplay  independent and simultaneous decisions by the players. 
From the standard analysis of the second-best theory (Lipsey and Lancaster, 1956; Rees, 
1984; Bös, 1986), the assumption of public leadership  has long been considered rather natural 
in mixed markets. In fact, claiming the sub-optimality of the marginal-cost  pricing, the public 
firm can optimally  depart from this rule by taking into account the reaction of the private 
firms when maximizing social welfare. This natural assumption has been criticized by 
Cremer et al. (1989) who instead supported the general plausibility of the (Cournot-) Nash 
equilibrium in the analysis of oligopolistic markets. Beato and Mas-Colell (1984) shared the 
idea of a dominant position of the public firm, but questioned the optimality of public 
leadership. If private leadership  is preferred to public leadership equilibrium, the public firm 
can commit itself to behaving as follower by announcing the marginal-cost  pricing rule 
instead of announcing its output. However, in all the cases it is assumed that the public firm 
can choose the type of the game independently of the behaviour of private firms.
In the present work, in order to endogenize the timing of the game, we apply the 
model developed by  Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) to the mixed oligopoly framework. In their 
insightful paper, the authors build an endogenous timing game by adding to the basic quantity 
game a preplay stage at which players simultaneously and independently decide whether to 
move early or late in the basic game. Therefore, the type of competition endogenously 
emerges in the subgame-perfect equilibrium (SPE) of this extended game. Amir and Grilo 
(1999) apply this model to a private duopoly  showing that, in a quantity setting with strategic 
substitutes, Cournot competition always occurs in the SPE of the endogenous timing game. 
Pal (1998) uses the same game structure to analyse a mixed oligopoly  and shows that 
3 Since profit or deficit of the public firm are not neutral transfers among agents of the same economy,  they 
ought not to be weighted as private profits or consumer net surplus in the utilitarian measure of welfare, but they 
should be weighted 
€ 
1+ λ( ) .
4sequential play always emerges in the SPE of the endogenous timing game. However, the 
public firm generally does not produce in equilibrium and public production is just a 
disciplinary  device that forces the private firms to produce more. Even though after Pal 
(1998) other authors analyzed the endogenous timing in mixed oligopolies, there is no work, 
at our best knowledge, that extends this line of research to the welfare evaluation of 
privatization.4
We believe that by endogenizing the timing of the game we can gain insights and 
provide a theoretic foundation to the idea that strategic interaction in mixed oligopolies may 
be different from the one in private oligopolies, and we can also explain the emergence of 
different types of competition in mixed oligopolies.
This is consistent  with stylized facts and empirical findings in mixed markets. For 
example, the state-owned Norwegian supplier of electricity, Statkraft, behaves as it was the 
residual producer in the case of dramatic price changes(Magnus and Midttun, 2000). We can 
interpret this behavior as the announcement by the state-owned firm that it  is committed to 
sustaining a certain price level on the market, that is to behave as follower with respect to 
private competitors that can choose the optimal level of production knowing the reaction of 
Statkraft. In industries such as the energy  markets, capacity investments can easily work as 
credible commitments by private firms to behave as leader in a Stackelberg game.
In general, we can think that whenever public firms commit themselves to pursuing 
market goals such as total quantity, price level or universal service obligations, they are 
announcing to “move late”, using the simple endogenous timing terminology.
In health care markets the public provider in countries like France and Germany is 
usually  considered as a leader when competing with private firms.5  The definition of 
performance objectives can be understood as a credible commitment to “move early” in order 
to act as a leader that takes into account what will be produced by the private competitors.
Furthermore, we think that this approach is especially relevant for the analysis of 
privatization, given that the results and the policy prescriptions emerged in the literature 
crucially rely on the type of competition that is assumed. For example, in de Fraja and 
Delbono (1989) it is shown that a shift form welfare to profit maximization may improve 
welfare under Cournot competition even without efficiency gains; while, if a Stackelberg 
game with public leadership is exogenously assumed, this cannot occur.6
The main results of our analysis can be summed up as follows.
With respect to the determination of the endogenous timing in mixed oligopoly, our 
4 Matsumura (2003), Cornes and Sepahvand (2003), and Sepahvand (2004) apply the same model to 
international mixed oligopolies finding that public leadership may emerge as the unique SPE of the endogenous 
timing game.
5 See for example Barros (1995).
6 Our definition of privatization is in fact very similar to the change in objective function defined in de Fraja 
and Delbono (1989). The only difference is that the proceedings from privatization are not a neutral transfer 
from domestic residents to the government since they are weighted by 
€ 
1+ λ( )  in the latter case.
5results differ from Pal (1998) in that either Nash, or private leadership, or both Stackelberg 
outcomes can result as subgame-perfect equilibria (SPE) of the endogenous timing game. 
Moreover, following the intuition of Beato and Mas-Colell (1984), we show that when both 
Stackelberg games are SPE of the endogenous timing game, private leadership is preferred by 
the public firm and is indeed selected when risk-dominance is used as equilibrium selection 
criterion. In addition, differently  from Pal (1998), the public firm is generally active on the 
market by producing positive quantity, except when too inefficient.
The identification of the equilibrium is crucial to the evaluation of the welfare impact 
of privatization. Indeed we show that, absent efficiency  gains, privatization never increases 
welfare. Furthermore, even when large efficiency gains are realized by privatization, an 
inefficient public firm may still be preferred. These results in the welfare comparisons rely on 
sequential outcomes being supported as SPE in a mixed oligopoly, whilein a private 
oligopolyonly simultaneous equilibria are implemented.
It is worth noting that our results are obtained in a framework of complete 
information and we do not take into account incentive problems. That is, we assume that the 
owners of the private firm as well as the government have direct control over the behaviour 
of managers of the private firm and the public one, respectively. So, both the choice of the 
timing and the strategies in the quantity  competition maximize the objective function of the 
owners.7
We also assume that government has the full bargaining power in the privatization 
process. This has important implications on the amount of the privatization proceeds; in such 
a case the price paid by the new private owners for the former public firm is equal to its profit 
in the new (Cournot) equilibrium. This assumption drives the results in favour of 
privatization, since it overweights the revenue from privatization by  
€ 
λ  in any welfare 
comparison.
In what follows, the next Section sets up the model. Section 3 is focused on the issue 
of endogenous timing in mixed oligopoly, while Section 4 is devoted to the analysis of 
privatization. Our conclusions are delegated to Section 5. The proofs are collected in the 
Appendix.
2  The basic setting
In a static, partial equilibrium analysis, we consider the simplest setting of a mixed 
duopoly, where a domestic private firm and a public one, labeled 
€ 
p  and 
€ 
g  respectively, 
produce a commodity and compete in a quantity  game. Demand preferences are described by 
a linear function where intercept and slope are normalized to one: 
 
€ 
p qg + qp( ) =1− qp − qg .
7 See Barros (1995)  for the analysis of competition in a mixed duopoly in the context of asymmetry of 
information between owners and managers.
6 Both firms are characterized by constant marginal costs and fixed costs corresponding to 
irreversible investments.8  More precisely, we assume that the public firm is already in the 
market and its fixed cost 
€ 
Kg  is sunk. Conversely, the fixed cost of the private firm, 
€ 
Kp , is 
borne only in the case of producing. Moreover, in order to simplify  the analysis, the marginal 
cost of the private firm is normalized to zero, while the one of the public firm is positive and 
equal to 
€ 
c ≥ 0 . Therefore  can be considered as an index of the inefficiency of the public 
firm.
The private firm maximizes its profit: 
 
€ 
Π p qg,qp( ) = 1− qg − qp( )qp −Kp .
 The public firm maximizes a utilitarian measure of welfare taking into account the shadow 
cost of public funds, 
€ 
λ > 0.  This parameter is a measure of the dead-weight loss due to 
distortionary taxation. In particular, let 
€ 
S(qp + qg )  denote the consumer gross surplus. We 
assume that the government can choose the output level of the public firm 
€ 
qg  and can make a 
monetary transfer 
€ 
T  to it. Therefore, in the presence of the shadow cost of public funds, the 
maximization problem of the government is: 
 
€ 
max
T ,qg
W qp,qg( ) = S(qp + qg ) − cqg −Kg −Kp − λT
 
€ 
such that ˜ Π g = p(qp + qg )qg − cqg −Kg + T ≥ 0  (1)
where 
€ 
˜ Π g  is the budget of the public firm including the (positive or negative) transfer 
€ 
T . 
Notice that the constraint (1) is not a hard budget  balance constraint but it is compatible with 
operative losses when 
€ 
T  is positive. Since welfare is decreasing in 
€ 
T  when 
€ 
λ  is positive, it  is 
optimal to set 
€ 
T  such that 
€ 
˜ Π g = 0 . Then, from (1) we get 
 
€ 
T = − p(qp + qg )qg − cqg −Kg[ ]
 and substituting  in the objective function we obtain: 
 
€ 
max
qg
W = S(qp + qg ) − cqg −Kg −Kp + λ p(qp + qg )qg − cqg −Kg[ ].
Defining the consumer net surplus as 
 
€ 
CS(qp + qg ) = S(qp + qg ) − p(qp + qg )(qp + qg ), (2)
 and the operative profit of the public firm as 
 
€ 
Πg qg,qp( ) = p(qp + qg )qg − cqg −Kg , (3)
 the maximization problem of the government is reduced to: 
8 We consider that the assumption of increasing returns to scale is consistent with the presence of a public 
incumbent, former monopolist, in a liberalized public utility industry. Nevertheless, the assumption decreasing 
return to scale is popular in the literature. For papers considering constant marginal costs, see Cremer et al. 
(1989), Pal (1998), and Martin (2004); while for papers adopting increasing marginal costs, see Beato and Mas-
Colell (1984), de Fraja and Delbono (1989), Fjell and Pal (1996), Pal and White (1998), Matsumura (1998).
7 
€ 
max
qg
W qg,qp( ) =CS(qp + qg ) +Π p qg ,qp( ) + (1+ λ)Πg qg,qp( ) . (4)
 So, the objective defined in equation (4) implies that a transfer occurs in order to guarantee 
the budget balance. This transfer is positive (negative) when the profits of the public firm are 
negative (positive).
The objective function (4) can be also interpreted as a weighted average of welfare – 
defined as the net surplus generated in the market – and profit, where the former is weighted 
by 
€ 
1/(1+ λ) , while the latter by 
€ 
λ/(1+ λ).
 
€ 
W qg,qp( ) =V qg,qp( ) + λΠg qg ,qp( )  (5)
 
€ 
∝
1
1+ λV qg,qp( ) +
λ
1+ λ Πg qg,qp( )
 where 
€ 
V qg,qp( ) =CS qg + qp( ) +Πg qg ,qp( ) +Π p qg ,qp( ) .
Other works on mixed oligopoly define the objective function of the public firm as a 
weighted average of welfare and profit. In fact, if we assumed a hard budget balance 
constraint without public transfer, as in Cremer et al. (1989), the weight given to the profit of 
the public firm would be endogenous and equal to the associate Lagrangian multiplier. 
Alternatively, as in Hindriks and Claude (2006), the weight could be positively related to the 
endogenously  chosen private share of a partially  public firm, while a negative relation may 
occur in equilibrium if incentive problemsare taken into account (Matsumura, 1998). In the 
present paper the weight associated to the profit of the public firm is exogenously correlated 
to the shadow costs of public funds. In our analysis, introducing  extends the contract 
theory approach of public monopoly regulation to the case of (mixed) oligopoly.
As usual, the best-reply  (or reaction) function of the private firm is derived from the 
first order condition: 
 
€ 
∂Π p qg,qp( )
∂qp
= p qg + qp( ) + p' qg + qp( )qp = 0
 In the presence of fixed costs, the reaction function of the private firm ought to be truncated 
in the point it crosses the zero-isoprofit curve and on-the-boundary solutions can occur in 
equilibrium. Given the model setting, it can be explicitly written in the following way: 
 
€ 
rp (qg ) =
1
2 1− qg( ) if qg < qg
0 if qg ≥ qg
⎧ 
⎨ 
⎪ 
⎩ ⎪ 
 (6)
 where 
€ 
qg = qg :Π p rp qg( ),qg( ) = 0 .
 The first order condition for the public firm can be derived from the objective (5): 
8€ 
∂W qg,qp( )
∂qg
= ∂V qg ,qp( )
∂qg
+ λ
∂Πg qg ,qp( )
∂qg
= p qg + qp( ) − c[ ] + λ p qg + qp( ) − c + p' qg + qp( )qg[ ] = 0.
 Notice that when 
€ 
λ = 0  the output decision of the public firm follows the marginal cost 
pricing rule, and the first term in square brackets measures its effect on total surplus 
(allocative effect). The second term is the effect on its own profit that prevents the 
government from using distortionary taxation to raise money  (we call it the distortionary 
effect). When 
€ 
λ → +∞ , the public firm plays as a private (Cournot) competitor.
Since there is no hard budget balance constraint and its fixed cost  is sunk, the 
reaction function of the the public firm is not truncated and it can be explicitly derived: 
 
€ 
rg (qp ) = max
1+ λ
1+ 2λ 1− c − qp( );0
⎧ 
⎨ 
⎩ 
⎫ 
⎬ 
⎭ 
. (7)
 However, we want to focus on the case in which both firms produce strictly positive 
quantities when they play simultaneously; so, we provide some assumptions on the 
admissible set in the space of parameters.
Assumption 1  The parameters  and  belong to the subspace 
 A⊂×
€ 
= c,λ( )c ∈ 0,12
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ ∨λ ∈ 0,λ[ ]
⎧ 
⎨ 
⎩ 
⎫ 
⎬ 
⎭ 
 where 
€ 
λ  is a finite, reasonable value of the shadow cost of public funds.9
Assumption 2 
€ 
Kp , the fixed cost of the private firm, belongs to the subspace B⊂
€ 
= 0,K p[ ], 
where 
€ 
K p  is smaller than the producer surplus of the private firm in any (simultaneous or 
sequential) equilibrium. 
9 According to the proof of Lemma 5,  is supposed to be lower than . Notice that any reasonable 
estimation of the shadow cost of public funds is never higher than .
9Figure 1: The reaction functions of the public and private firms.
In Figure 1, the reaction functions are depicted. Coherently with the Assumptions 1 
and 2, the intersection occurs in the interior of the parameters space where both firms 
produce strictly positive quantities. 
An increase in 
€ 
λ  has the effect  of reducing both intercept and slope of the reaction 
function of the public firm. When 
€ 
λ  tends to infinite, the public firm plays as a profit 
maximizer.
3  Endogenous timing in a mixed duopoly
In this Section we investigate how the determination of simultaneous (Nash-Cournot) 
versus sequential (Stackelberg) games is the result of preplay independent and simultaneous 
decisions by the players.10
In many works on mixed oligopoly  and privatization, the timing of the competition 
(simultaneous or sequential) is generally assumed, and simultaneous playing is mostly 
adopted.11 Of course, this assumption is not neutral and, as discussed in the Introduction, the 
welfare impact of privatization crucially depends on the assumed timing.
10 Notice that in formal game-theoretical terms, Stackelberg's proposal is not to be understood as a new solution 
concept for one-shot games,  but rather as a subgame-perfect equilibrium of a two-stage game of perfect 
information with exogenously given first and second movers.
11 In Cremer et al. (1989, p. 284), the reason for using a simultaneous timing is summarized as follows: “The 
common use of the Nash equilibrium in industrial organization [...] suggests that this is at least as plausible as 
the leader-follower situations [...].”
10
More recently, other works introduced the idea that the order of play should result 
from the timing decisions of the players. In particular, Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) andAmir 
and Grilo (1999) demonstrate that  simultaneous play  emerges as the unique equilibrium of 
the endogenous game in a private duopoly  with strategic substitutability. Conversely, in a 
mixed duopoly Pal (1998) shows that sequential play always occurs in equilibrium.
Coherently with this approach, in order to endogenize the timing of the play, we use 
the game with observable delay defined by Hamilton and Slutsky  (1990). In the first stage 
firms simultaneously and independently  choose the timing of action (whether to move early 
or late) and then, after observing the decision of the other player, they  play  the basic quantity 
game. The extensive form of the game is represented in Figure 2. 
Figure 2: The extensive form of the extended game with observable delay defined 
byHamilton and Slutsky (1990) applied to a mixed duopoly. MN, PL and GL stay for Mixed 
duopoly Nash, Private Leadership and Public Leadership equilibria respectively.
The relevant equilibrium concept is the subgame-perfect  equilibrium (SPE) and each 
player decides the timing of action according to the outcomes in the second stage. Of course, 
none of the firms can choose the type of competition by itself, but  it can only eliminate some 
outcome. For example, if firm i decides to move early  two outcomes are possible according 
to the decision of the other player; only the Stackelberg outcome where firm i is follower is 
ruled out by its decision.
Assuming existence and uniqueness of equilibria in each basic game, the following 
Lemma summarizes the results obtained in Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) for any two-player 
game.
Lemma 3 Consider a two-player game for which the Nash and the two Stackelberg 
equilibria exist. The set of (pure strategy) SPE of the endogenous timing game is defined in 
11
the following way:
i) the Stackelberg follower payoff is lower than the Nash payoff for each firm, then 
the unique SPE of the endogenous timing game is the Nash equilibrium where both 
firms decide to move early;
ii)if the Stackelberg follower payoff is strictly larger than the Nash payoff for each 
firm, then both Stackelberg equilibria are SPE of the endogenous timing game;
iii)if the payoff of firm i when Stackelberg follower is strictly larger than its Nash 
payoff, and if firm j prefers to play simultaneously rather than as Stackelberg 
follower, the unique SPE of the endogenous timing game is the Stackelberg 
equilibrium with firm j being the leader.
Proof. The proof of this Lemma follows from Theorems II, III and IV in Hamilton 
and Slutsky (1990).■
The intuition behind these results is the following. Both firms prefer to be leader 
rather than playing simultaneously. This is true whenever the reaction correspondences are 
continuous, strictly decreasing function, and equilibria are interior, as in the present model. 
So, we need to compare the simultaneous-play payoff with the follower payoff in order to see 
whether firms have dominant strategies or not. If the Nash payoff is higher than the follower 
payoff, then any  firm has a dominant strategy to move early. But if one firm prefers its 
follower payoff to the Nash payoff, there is no dominant strategy: when the other player 
moves early  it  prefers to move late and vice versa. This explains the three possible outcomes 
listed in Lemma 3. Existence and uniqueness of the equilibria in each basic game are assured 
by Assumptions 1 and 2. The reduced form of the endogenous timing game for the mixed 
duopoly is represented in Table 1.
Private Firm
Public Firm Early Late
Early
€ 
W MN (.),
€ 
Π p
MN (.)
€ 
W GL (.),
€ 
Π p
GL (.)
Late
€ 
W PL (.),
€ 
Π p
PL (.)
€ 
W MN (.),
€ 
Π p
MN (.)
Table 1: The reduced form of the endogenous timing game.
In order to solve the game we need to compare the equilibrium payoffs in each basic 
game. In what follows the simultaneous and sequential equilibria are derived.
3.1  Simultaneous equilibrium
When firms play simultaneously, the equilibrium output levels solve the system of the 
best-reply functions (6) and (7). We refer to this equilibrium as a mixed duopoly Nash 
12
equilibrium and the equilibrium values are labeled by 
€ 
MN . The output levels and the price in 
equilibrium are:
€ 
qgMN = 1+ λ( )
1− 2c( )
3λ +1( )
; qpMN = c + λ
1− 2c( )
3λ +1( )
;
QMN = 1− c( ) − λ 1− 2c( )3λ +1( )
; pMN = c + λ 1− 2c( )3λ +1( )
.
Notice that  when 
€ 
λ = 0 , the equilibrium price is equal to the marginal cost of the 
public firm. Indeed the public firmadjust its own output in order to have a total quantity equal 
to the one implemented by  a welfare maximizer (but inefficient) monopoly; but now the 
welfare is higher.12 Moreover, when the public firm is as efficient as the private one, the first 
best solution is implemented.
As 
€ 
λ  increases, the public firm equilibrium output 
€ 
qgMN  decreases and 
€ 
qpMN  increases; 
then, the industry total cost  decreases enhancing productive efficiency. This is because the 
concern for public transfers serves as a credible commitment for the public firm to decrease 
its own output. Moreover, since the best-reply functions are contractions, the total output 
level 
€ 
QMN  decreases and the market price 
€ 
pMN  increases. It is obvious that the effect on 
consumer surplus is negative, raising an allocative inefficiency. There exists a clear trade-off 
between technical and allocative efficiency, and the net effect on total surplus is ambiguous 
and depends on the parameters. The equilibrium values of profits and welfare are summarized 
in the Appendix, Table 2.
3.2  Sequential equilibria
A Stackelberg equilibrium of this game corresponds to the SPE of a two stage game 
of perfect information in which the second mover (follower) chooses an action after having 
observed the action of the first mover (leader). Then, the Stackelberg equilibrium imposes 
that: (i) the strategy of the second mover is a selection from its own reaction function; and (ii) 
the first mover chooses an action that  maximizes its objective given the anticipation of the 
reaction by the other player.In what follows we first analyze the case of public leadership  and 
then the private leadership equilibrium.
Public leadership (GL).
When the public firm moves before its private competitor, the equilibrium quantities 
solve the following equation system: 
€ 
qgGL = argmaxW qg ,rp (qg )( )
qpGL = rp qgGL( ).
12 This is because the same total output is partially produced by the more efficient private competitor.
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 The solution is: 
€ 
qgGL =max
1+ 2λ( ) − 4c 1+ λ( )
1+ 4λ( )
,0
⎧ 
⎨ 
⎩ 
⎫ 
⎬ 
⎭ 
qpGL =
1
2 1− qg
GL( ).
 We have to distinguish two cases since there exists a threshold value of the marginal cost of 
the public firm such that 
€ 
∀c ∈ 0, 1+ 2λ4 1+ λ( )
⎡ 
⎣ 
⎢ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟  the public firm produces a positive quantity in 
equilibrium. When 
€ 
c ∈ 1+ 2λ4 1+ λ( )
, 12
⎡ 
⎣ 
⎢ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟  the public firm prefers not to produce and the private 
firm acts as a monopolist: its quantity, market price, and welfare are the same as in a private 
monopoly.
Since the threshold value 
€ 
1+ 2λ
4 1+ λ( )  is increasing, as  increases an higher level of 
inefficiency is compatible with positive production by the public firm. Table 3 in the 
Appendixsummarizes quantities, profits and welfare in the public leadership equilibrium.
Private leadership (PL).
Assume that the private firm moves before its public competitor, that is, it behaves as 
a leader in the Stackelberg game. The equilibrium quantities solve the following equation 
system: 
€ 
qpPL = argmaxΠ p rg (qp ),qp( )
qgPL = rg qpPL( ).
The solution is: 
€ 
qpPL =min
1
2
c + λ + cλ( )
λ
,1− c
⎧ 
⎨ 
⎩ 
⎫ 
⎬ 
⎭ 
qgPL =
1+ λ
1+ 2λ 1− c − qp
PL( ).
 As before, we have two different cases depending on the value of . 
€ 
∀c ∈ 0, λ3λ +1
⎡ 
⎣ ⎢ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟  the 
public firm produces a positive quantity in equilibrium; more precisely, it is optimal for the 
private leader to choose a quantity such that the best response of the public firm is positive. 
When 
€ 
c ∈ λ3λ +1,
1
2
⎡ 
⎣ ⎢ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟  the public firm does not produce in equilibrium and the private firm 
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produces the same quantity as an inefficientpublic monopolist: its quantity, as a limit level, is 
such that the market price is equal to the marginal cost  of the public firm.13 Of course total 
surplus is higher because the private competitor produces more efficiently.
Moreover, as 
€ 
λ  increases, a larger inefficiency is compatible with a positive 
production by the public firm. Quantities, profits and welfare in the private leadership 
equilibrium are summarized in the Appendix, Table 4.
3.3  Endogenous timing equilibria
In this section we derive the endogenous timing equilibrium of the mixed duopoly 
game. In order to apply  Lemma 3 we need to rank the payoffs of both firms in the different 
equilibria. More precisely, we need only to compare the payoff of the follower to the 
simultaneous-play payoff since, by the standard properties of Stackelberg equilibrium, both 
players always prefer to be leader rather than simultaneous-move player. Furthermore, the 
comparison between the payoff of the leader and the one if the follower is useless since no 
firm can unilaterally switch from one sequential equilibrium to the other.
In Lemma 4 we perform the comparison on the profit of the private firm, while in 
Lemma 5 we compare the welfare under private leadership with the one in the Nash 
equilibrium.
Lemma 4 There exists a subspace 
€ 
F1 = (c,λ)⊆ A , such that the private firm strictly 
prefers the public leadership equilibrium to the mixed duopoly Nash equilibrium. In the 
subspace  the reverse is true. 
Lemma 5 There exists a subspace 
€ 
F2 = (c,λ)⊆ A , such that the public firm strictly 
prefers the private leadership equilibrium to the mixed duopoly Nash equilibrium. In the 
subspace 
€ 
ˆ F 2 = A − F2  the reverse is true. 
Theorem 6 provides the results for the endogenous timing equilibrium in the mixed 
duopoly. 
Theorem 6  Consider a mixed duopoly game in which the order of moves is 
endogenous. The SPE of the endogenous timing game are defined in the following way:
i)When 
€ 
c,λ( )∈ ˆ F 2 , the mixed duopoly Nash equilibrium is the unique SPE of the 
game; 
ii)When 
€ 
c,λ( )∈ ˆ F 1∩ F2 , the unique SPE of the game is the Stackelberg equilibrium 
with the private firm acting as leader; 
13 This is the standard case when : the public follower can always produce the quantity needed to achieve 
this target and, anticipating this strategy, the best action for the private firm is to produce that quantity.
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iii)When 
€ 
c,λ( )∈ F1 , both Stackelberg outcomes are the (pure strategy) SPE of the 
game. 
The results may be better understood when compared to those obtained in a private 
duopoly.14 In the latter case, moving early is a dominant strategy for both private firms since 
the payoff of the leader is larger than the simultaneous-play payoff, which is in turn larger 
than the payoff of the follower. This result is driven by two properties of the objective 
functions of private firms:
a)the profit of any private firm is strictly decreasing in the output of the rival; 
b)reaction functions are downward sloping. 
So, when leader, any private firm increases its own production with respect to 
Cournot output in order to induce a reduction in the output of the rival. As a result, the 
follower is always worse off and strictly prefers to be simultaneous player rather than 
follower. Therefore, the conditions of point i) of Lemma 3 apply.
In the mixed duopoly described in the present paper the objective function of the 
private firm has the same properties highlighted above. However, the one of the public firm 
has different features:
a)welfare function (4) may be either decreasing or increasing in the output of the 
private firm;
b)the reaction function of the public firm is downward sloping. 
When welfare is increasing in the output of the private firm, the public leader 
decreases its own output with respect to Cournot equilibrium in order to induce an increase in 
private production. The private follower is then better off with respect to Cournot 
equilibrium. When the private firm is the leader, it always increases its own output in order to 
induce a contraction in the output  of the public firm. However, welfare will be positively 
affected and the public firm will prefer to be follower than simultaneous player. As a result, 
the conditions of point ii) of Lemma 3 apply  and both Stackelberg equilibria are SPE of the 
endogenous timing game, as stated at point iii) of Theorem 6.
It is worth noting that under public leadership welfare increases with respect to 
Cournot equilibrium despite a reduction in total quantity.15  This result occurs when the 
increase in productive efficiency due to the shift of some production to the private firms 
outweighs the negative allocative efficiency effect due to the reduction in total quantity.
Under private leadership, on the contrary, both private production and total output 
increase; therefore allocative and productive efficiency rise. Then, we would expect that the 
space of parameters such that the public firm prefers to be follower rather than simultaneous 
14 See Amir and Grilo (1999).
15 The public leader reduces its quantity and the private follower increases it, but by a smaller amount since the 
reaction functions are contraction.
16
player is larger than the one where the private firm does. This explains the result  at point ii) 
of Theorem 6 where private leadership is the unique SPE of the endogenous timing game.
Finally, when the welfare function (4) is decreasing in the output of the private firm, 
the same equilibrium as a private duopoly is selected; this explains the result at point i) of 
Theorem 6.
The introduction of the shadow cost of public funds is the key determinant of the 
difference of our results with respect to Pal (1998). In his work simultaneous play is never an 
equilibrium because the objective function of the public firm is always increasing in the 
output of the rival. The novel contribution of our analysis is to enlarge the set of possible 
outcomes. Figure 3 depicts the three possible outcomes of the endogenous timing game in the 
space 
€ 
c,λ( ) .
Figure  3: SPE of the endogenous timing game in the space of parameters 
€ 
c,λ( ) .
Moreover, the public firm in Pal (1998) generally does not produce in equilibrium and 
essentially  acts as a disciplinary device that forces the private firms to produce the limit 
quantity in order to avoid entry.16 In our framework, taking into account the shadow cost of 
public funds, the public firm usually  produces a positive quantity  in equilibrium. This result 
enhances the realism of our approach where the public firm represents not only a threat of 
producing, but it has an active role in the industry. The following corollary define the 
conditions under which the public firm is active on the market. 
16 In particular, in the private leadership case, the author shows that the public firm never produces.
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Corollary 7 In a mixed duopoly, when the public firm maximizes welfare taking into 
account the shadow costs of public funds :
i)whenever the mixed duopoly Nash equilibrium is the unique SPE of the endogenous 
timing game the public firm produces a positive quantity; 
ii)when private leadership  arises in the SPE of the endogenous timing game, the 
public firm produces positive quantities when 
€ 
c < λ3λ +1; 
iii)when public leadership arises in the SPE of the endogenous timing game, the 
public firm produces positive quantities when 
€ 
c < 1+ 2λ4 1+ λ( )
Proof. See Tables 2, 3, and 4 in the Appendix. ■
3.4  Equilibrium selection
In the subspace  the endogenous timing game of the mixed duopoly has two pure-
strategy Nash equilibria. Then, this is a standard coordination game with two pure-strategy 
Nash equilibria and one mixed-strategy equilibrium. We now analyze the pure-strategy 
equilibrium selection problem according to the risk dominance criterion developed by 
Harsanyi and Selten (1988).17  Applied to coordination games with two pure-strategy 
equilibria, this procedure picks the equilibrium that has the largest basin of attraction in the 
initial beliefs of each player on the behavior of the other player. In other words, it minimizes 
the risk of a coordination failure due to the strategic uncertainty that players face in a 
coordination game (Amir and Stepanova, 2006). This criterion proved to be a powerful 
selection concept in experiments of coordination games (Cooper et al., 1990; Van-Huyck et 
al., 1990) and in evolutionary games characterized by experimentation and myopic learning 
(Ellison, 1993; Kandori et  al., 1993). It is shown that the risk dominant equilibrium is often 
selected even when it is Pareto dominated by another equilibrium. One equilibrium risk-
dominates the other if it is associated with the larger product of deviation losses. In our 
framework this means that private leadership is selected using the risk-dominance criterion if 
 
€ 
W PL −W MN( ) Π pPL −Π pMN( ) > W GL −W MN( ) W GL −Π pMN( ). (8)
Theorem 8  The private leadership equilibrium risk-dominates the public leadership 
equilibrium 
€ 
∀ c,λ( )∈ F1.
17 In the present setting it is possible to show that the standard refinements of Nash equilibrium for normal form 
games - perfection, properness and strategic stability - cannot be invoked to rule out one of the pure strategy 
SPE. Furthermore, Pareto dominance selects the private leadership equilibrium only in a subspace of .
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The risk dominance criterion selects in the whole set  
€ 
F1  the same equilibrium that the 
Pareto dominance criterion is able to select only  in a subspace of 
€ 
F1 . It is important to 
highlight that the risk-dominance criterion is applied to the reduced game, and not to the 
entire two-stage game of endogenous timing, and the two options are a priori entirely 
different. However, since each subgame has a unique Nash equilibrium and given the use of 
subgame perfection in this framework, our application of the risk-dominance criterion on the 
reduced game seems to us rather natural.18 Amir and Stepanova (2006) suggest the following 
interpretation: the private leadership  equilibrium is chosen by firms that wish to minimize the 
risk of coordination failure in their timing decisions. 
The preference for the private leadership  equilibrium is the main contribution in 
Beato and Mas-Colell (1984), where it  is assumed that the public firm is committed to a 
decision rule (in their case the marginal-cost pricing rule), and the private firm maximizes its 
own profit given the decision rule of the public competitor. In the present setting, using the 
game with observable delay  of Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) coupled with risk dominance as 
a selection criterion, we show that the private leadership equilibrium emerges as the 
endogenous equilibrium in the mixed duopoly 
€ 
∀ c,λ( )∈ F2.
4  Welfare effect of privatization
In this Section we perform a comparative statics exercise in order to analyze the 
effects of privatization on welfare taking into account the result of the previous Section on 
the endogenous timing equilibrium.
By privatization we mean that the public firm is sold by the government and the 
management is instructed by the new owners to maximize profits:19
€ 
Πg qg,qp( ) = p qg ,qp( ) − c[ ]qg .
 This change in ownership  might have in principle the effect of enhancing the productive 
efficiency of the former public firm. We consider the two extreme cases in which either no 
efficiency gain or full efficiency are achieved. In the first case, the privatized firm retains the 
same technology  as before; in the latter, it is able to produce at the same marginal cost of its 
competitor, here normalized to zero. After privatization, the new reaction function of firm  
is: 
18 See van Damme and Hurkens (2004) and Amir and Stepanova (2006) for the application of the risk-
dominance criterion on the reduced game of endogenous timing models in price game duopolies.
19 As in the mixed duopoly case, we assume that the fixed cost is sunk and already paid by the government. So, it 
is included in the welfare,  weighted , but not in the profit of the privatized firm. Moreover, For 
simplicity, we keep the same subscripts as in the mixed oligopoly framework.  From now on,  stands for the 
privatized firm.
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€ 
rg (qp ) = max
1
2 1− c − qp( ),0
⎧ 
⎨ 
⎩ 
⎫ 
⎬ 
⎭ 
 (9)
 with  in the case of full efficiency gains. Comparing the reaction function before and 
after privatization, it is easy to see that it becomes steeper. Indeed: 
 
€ 
1+ λ
1+ 2λ >
1
2 ∀λ ∈ 0,λ( )
 and only when   the slope of the reaction function (7) of the public firm converges to 
the slope of the reaction function (6) of the private firm.
Absent efficiency gains, also the intercept is reduced after privatization. With full 
efficiency gains the intercept increases only when 
€ 
c > 12 1+ λ( ) .
The change in the reaction function is not the sole effect of privatization. In fact, we 
have to consider the possible change in the endogenous timing equilibrium. In order to derive 
the SPE of the game after privatization, we can rely on the workofAmir and Grilo (1999) who 
apply  the same endogenous timing structure to a private duopoly. The following Theorem 
summarizes the results in the framework of the present paper.
Theorem 9  Consider a private duopoly quantity game with strategic substitutes. 
When the values of the parameters are in the admissible set A, the unique SPE of the 
endogenous timing game is the Cournot-Nash equilibrium where both firms decide to move 
early. 
Proof of Theorem. Under Assumptions 1 and 2 no Nash equilibrium lies on the 
boundary, i.e. no firm produces zero output. In this case we can apply  Theorem 2.2 in Amir 
and Grilo (1999) that proves that both firms prefer always to be simultaneous player rather 
than Stackelberg follower. So, according to point i) of Lemma 3, the unique SPE of the 
endogenous timing game is the Cournot-Nash equilibrium. ■
The intuition for this result is clear. Since the profit is strictly decreasing in the output 
of the rival, a private leader always increases its own quantity in comparison with the 
Cournot-Nash quantity. By the same reason, a private follower is always strictly  worse off 
with respect to the Cournot-Nash equilibrium. Then, sequential play is only sustainable in a 
mixed duopoly.
The Cournot-Nash equilibrium is the solution of the system of equations (6) and (9). 
Quantities and price are:20
20 Superscript CN denotes the Cournot-Nash equilibrium.
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€ 
qgCN =
1− 2c
3 ; qp
CN = 1+ c3
QCN = 2 − c3 ; p
CN = 1+ c3 .
In our analysis the new owners are always national. The (domestic) total surplus and 
the profit of the privatized firm are: 
€ 
VCN = 8 − 8c +11c
2
18 −Kg −Kp; Πg
CN = 1− 2c3
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
2
 Recall that in the case of full efficient privatization .
In order to compare welfare before and after privatization, the price paid to the 
government for the privatized firm matters. Since we are taking into account the shadow cost 
of public funds, it is not indifferent whether profits are public or private, and if the 
government is able to raise enough money from privatization. Given the equilibrium after 
privatization, the more money the government is able to raise by selling the public firm, the 
higher the welfare after the privatization. In the first instance, we give full bargaining power 
to the government; i.e., we assume that it is able to extract the whole profit from the 
privatized firm. In such a case, total welfare in the Cournot-Nash equilibrium is: 
 
€ 
W CN = 118 2λ +11c
2 + 8 − 8c 1+ λ − cλ( )( ) − 1+ λ( )Kg −Kp . (10)
The following Theorem states the result  of the comparison when no efficiency gain 
occurs after privatization.
Theorem 10 Consider a mixed duopoly game in which the order of moves is 
endogenous. In addition, assume that by privatization the firm does not achieve any efficiency 
gain. Then, privatization always reduces welfare even when all the profits are extracted by 
the government. 
This result crucially  relies on the endogeneity of the timing of competition before and 
after privatization. In fact, when the public firm is highly  inefficient, the endogenous timing 
equilibrium is characterized by private leadership  (see Figure 3 and Theorem 8). Therefore, 
the effect of privatization consists not only  in a change of the objective function of the former 
public firm, but also in a shift from sequential to simultaneous play. Since private leadership 
implements a welfare superior allocation, privatization can never improve total welfare 
absent efficiency gains. This reasoning does not apply when  is high and Cournot-Nash 
equilibrium occurs both before and after privatization. In such a case, however, the public 
firm is already mimicking the behaviour of a private firm and privatization does not improve 
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the situation.21
Our result is in sharp  contrast with those obtained assuming simultaneous playing. For 
example, de Fraja and Delbono (1989) show that, assuming Cournot competition, a change in 
the objective function of the private firm from welfare to profit  maximization may enhance 
welfare absent efficiency  gains.22  The same result holds in the framework of the present 
paper. Disregarding the endogenous timing game, and comparing  from Table 2 and 
 from equation (10) 
€ 
∀ c,λ( )∈ A , privatization may  increase welfare. More precisely, it 
occurs when 
 
€ 
c > 4λ + 6λ
2 +1
26λ +12λ2 + 8 .
 The latter result is true even when the shadow cost of public funds is disregarded (i.e., 
) and therefore crucially relies on the assumption of simultaneous move game.23 It is 
also important  to notice that the assumption of linear cost is not crucial for the result. From 
Theorem 6 it is clear that the endogenous timing equilibrium is essentially determined by the 
objective function of the public firm being either increasing or decreasing in the production 
of the private firm. The latter condition is not affected by the shape of the cost function.
Now, we move to the analysis of the other extreme case: full efficient privatization. 
The following Theorem formalizes the result.
Theorem 11  Consider a mixed duopoly game in which the order of moves is 
endogenous. In addition, assume that by privatization the firm achieves full efficiency and all 
the profits are extracted by the government. Then, there exists a subset of the parameter 
, such that the privatization reduces welfare. 
21 Actually, in such cases privatization may worsen the profitability of the firm. Under simultaneous-move 
quantity competition it is easy to show that the profits of a firm that maximizes a weighted average of welfare 
and profits may be larger than those of a firm maximizing profits only.
22 This result is obtained in a different setting with symmetric firms and increasing marginal costs.
23 A difference between our model and the one in de Fraja and Delbono (1989) is that in the latter the number of 
private firms matters for the equilibrium, and a shift toward profit maximization is welfare improving in a more 
competitive market. In the present model, the level of competition affects the results in two opposite direction. 
On one side, a more competitive environment reduces the allocative negative effect of a reduction in the 
production of the privatized firm. On the other side, following Pal (1998),  a larger number of private 
competitors allows the selection of the private leadership equilibrium that is generally welfare superior to all the 
other possible outcomes. More work is needed to assess the relative importance of the two effects.
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Figure 4: The welfare effect of a full efficient privatization: in gray the space of the 
parameters in where privatization reduces welfare when the government extracts all the 
profits from the privatized firm.
In Figure 4 we graph the set  in the space of parameters where a fully  efficient 
privatization reduces welfare. Endogenizing the timing of competition, before and after 
privatization, enlarges this space with respect to the simultaneous case. In fact, it is easy  to 
show that assuming simultaneous competition privatization reduces welfare if 
€ 
c <
3 1+ 2λ( )2 − 1+ 3λ( ) 2 3+ 8λ 1+ λ( )( )
3 1+ λ( ) 3+ 8λ( ) .
It is interesting to notice that the level of  such that public ownership is the 
dominant solution in terms of welfare is decreasing in . Thus, the more the public firm 
behaves as a profit maximizer, the better is to privatize it.
This result is obtained assuming that the government is able to extract the whole 
profit from the new owners of the privatized firm. Suppose now that the government is able 
to take just half of the profit. In Figure 4 we can see how the space of the parameters such 
that the privatization reduces welfare is enlarged. The dashed line delimits the space of a 
welfare-reducing full efficient privatization when the government sells the public firm at a 
price equal to half of the future profits.
An extreme result occurs when the firm is sold for free. In this latter case, a full 
efficient privatization always lowers welfare.
23
5  Conclusions
The aim of the present work is to characterize the equilibrium and analyze the effect 
of privatization in a mixed duopoly where an inefficient welfare-maximizing public firm 
competes in the quantities with a domestic private one.
We do not assume the timing of competition a priori. Rather, we endogenize the 
determination of simultaneous (Nash-Cournot) versus sequential (Stackelberg) games by 
applying the model of Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) to this mixed duopoly framework.
Since we mainly refer to public utility  markets open to competition, we assume that 
the production technology is characterized by increasing return to scale, with fixed cost and 
constant marginal cost. In this framework, we assume that the management of the public firm 
is instructed to maximize welfare taking into account the shadow cost of public funds. As the 
following citation suggests, this approach has been generally  used to characterize public 
monopolies running a deficit.
[M]any public enterprises are natural monopolies, i.e. firms that exhibit 
increasing returns to scale. Once it has been proved desirable to run such an 
enterprise at all, its product should be priced at marginal cost provided the 
resulting deficit can be financed through lump-sum taxes. If there are not 
lump-sum, discrepancies between consumer and producer taxes will result in 
inefficiencies in the rest of the economy. (...) This has been taken as an 
argument for requiring the public enterprise to cover, by its own means, at 
least part of its deficit.(Marchand et al., 1984) 
We believe that extending this approach to the mixed duopoly framework is rather 
natural and fills, at least partially, some gaps of the previous literature. Indeed, discussing the 
results of their paper, Beatoand Mas-Colell (1984, p. 82) state:
Finally, the limitations of this paper and the need for further work should be 
clear. We have, for example, ruled out both fixed cost and the general 
equilibrium effects of distortions in other markets. We do not know if 
reasonable versions of the main results of this paper [...] are available in these 
richer settings. 
The extensive process of privatization started in the eighties of the last century and 
still in place nowadays is essentially  driven by  the belief that private discipline and profit 
motivation can enhance efficiency. Moreover, privatization is also considered as a powerful 
instrument to raise money  to reduce distortionary taxation. In this work we contrast the 
general extent of these ideas. We show that, absent efficiency gains, privatization never 
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increases welfare, and that an inefficient  public firm may be preferred even when large 
efficiency gains could be realized by privatization. These results are obtained assuming that 
both the profit of the public firm and the privatization proceeds are substitute for 
distortionary taxation. The endogenous timing model applied to the mixed oligopoly 
framework is not less important for our results. While after privatization only the 
simultaneous (Nash-Cournot) equilibrium can be implemented, with a public firm sequential 
equilibria – that are always welfare superior – may be sustained as SPE of the endogenous 
timing game. Therefore, privatization changes not only the ownership  and the objective 
function of the public firm, but also the type of competition in the market. 
Finally, the assumption of larger marginal cost for the public firm deserves a last 
comment. In our model we follow the general presumption that public ownership is relatively 
inefficient when compared to private ownership. This has been justified by the theory of 
incentives that has been used to demonstrate that agency problems in state-owned enterprises 
can cause larger inefficiencies than in private-owned firms. But we are aware that from an 
empirical point of view the picture is quite mixed and the variance of the results substantial 
(Cuervo and Villalonga, 2000).24  However, any relaxation of our assumption obviously 
strengthen the results obtained in this paper.
Appendix
The Appendix contains all the proofs of the paper and the Tables showing the 
equilibrium values in the different basic games analyzed.
Proof of Lemma 4. Comparing the equilibrium profits 
€ 
Π p
GL  in Table 3 with 
€ 
Π p
MN  in 
Table 2, it easy to check that 
€ 
∀λ ≥ 0 :
i)
€ 
∀c ∈ 0, 1+ 2λ4 1+ λ( )
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
€ 
Π p
GL −Π p
MN > 0 ∀c > c λ( )
 where 
€ 
c λ( ) = λ
2
2λ2 + 3λ +1  
with 
€ 
∂c λ( )
∂λ
> 0.
ii)
€ 
∀c ∈ 1+ 2λ4 1+ λ( )
, 12
⎡ 
⎣ 
⎢ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ , 
€ 
Π p
GL −Π p
MN > 0  always. 
Thus, we define the subspace 
€ 
F1 and 
€ 
ˆ F 1  as follows: 
 
€ 
F1 = (c,λ)⊆ A | c > c λ( ){ } and ˆ F 1 = (c,λ)⊆ A | c ≤ c λ( ){ }. (11)
24 See for example the reviews of Megginson and Netter (2001) and Willner (2001) that report the results of 
hundreds of empirical papers on privatization and on the comparison of private and public ownership, and 
Newbery (2000, chapter 3) that summarizes empirical findings on the technical and economic efficiency of 
private and public firms in utility markets.
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Proof of Lemma 5 . Comparing the welfare level 
€ 
W PL  in Table 4 with 
€ 
W MN  Table 2, 
it easy to check that 
€ 
∀λ ∈ λ( ) :25
i)
€ 
∀c ∈ 0, λ3λ +1
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
 
€ 
W PL −W MN > 0 ∀c > c λ( )
 where 
 
€ 
c λ( ) = 3λ
2 + 7λ3
21λ + 34λ2 +17λ3 + 4 with
∂c λ( )
∂λ
> 0.
ii)
€ 
∀c ∈ λ3λ +1,
1
2
⎡ 
⎣ ⎢ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ , 
 
€ 
W PL −W MN > 0 ∀λ ∈ 0,λ( ).
Thus, we define the subspace  and  as follows: 
 
€ 
F2 = (c,λ)⊆ A | c > c λ( ){ } and ˆ F 2 = (c,λ)⊆ A | c ≤ c λ( ){ } (12)
■
Proof of Theorem 6.
i)When 
€ 
c,λ( )∈ ˆ F 1  the private firm prefers the mixed duopoly Nash equilibrium to the 
public leadership equilibrium. When 
€ 
c,λ( )∈ ˆ F 2  the public firm is better off in the 
Nash equilibrium than in the private leadership equilibrium. Therefore, in the 
intersection space 
€ 
ˆ F 1∩ ˆ F 2,  no firm wants to be follower. Since 
€ 
∀λ ∈ 0,λ( ) , 
€ 
c λ( ) < c λ( ) , it follows that 
€ 
ˆ F 2 ⊂ ˆ F 1 ; then 
€ 
ˆ F 1∩ ˆ F 2  coincides with . Given that each 
player always prefers to be the Stackelberg leader rather than a simultaneous player, 
point i) of Lemma 3 applies and the mixed duopoly Nash equilibrium is the unique 
SPE of the endogenous timing game.
ii)When 
€ 
c,λ( )∈ ˆ F 1  the private firm prefers the mixed duopoly Nash equilibrium to 
the public leadership  equilibrium. When 
€ 
c,λ( )∈ F2  the public firm is better off in the 
private leadership equilibrium rather than in the mixed duopoly Nash equilibrium. So, 
point iii) of Lemma 3 applies and the Stackelberg equilibrium with the private firm 
acting as leader is the unique SPE of the endogenous timing game.
25 The threshold 
€ 
c < λ 3λ + 1( )  
€ 
∀λ < 5.37228 . Since 
€ 
λ  is a measure of the distortion by taxation, we are 
comfortable assuming that 
€ 
λ  is lower than 
€ 
5.37228. If 
€ 
λ ≥ 5.37228 we would have that 
€ 
W PL <W MN  always.
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iii)When 
€ 
c,λ( )∈ F1  the private firm prefers to play  as Stackelberg follower rather 
than to play simultaneously. When 
€ 
c,λ( )∈ F2  the public firm prefers to play as 
Stackelberg follower rather than playing simultaneously. Since
€ 
∀λ > 0 , 
€ 
c λ( ) < c λ( ) , it 
follows that 
€ 
F1 ⊂ F2; then 
€ 
F1∩ F2  coincides with 
€ 
F1 . So, point ii) of Lemma 3 applies 
and both Stackelberg equilibria belong to the set of the (pure strategy) SPE of the 
endogenous timing game. 
■
Proof of Theorem 8. In order to prove the result we need to consider three cases 
depending on the fact that boundary solutions may occur in the two sequential equilibria. By 
comparing the thresholds defined in Section 3.2, we have the following equilibria:
i)when 
€ 
c,λ( )∈ F1  and 
€ 
c < λ1+ 3λ , both Stackelberg equilibria are interior. Then, the 
values of 
€ 
W GL , 
€ 
Π p
GL , 
€ 
W PL and 
€ 
Π p
PL  of interest are those in the first row of Tables 3 
and 4.
ii)when 
€ 
c,λ( )∈ F1  and 
€ 
λ
1+ 3λ < c <
1+ 2λ
4 1+ λ( ) , the public firm does not produce in the 
private leadership equilibrium while it produces positive quantity in the public 
leadership equilibrium. Then, the values of 
€ 
W GL  and 
€ 
Π p
GL of interest are those in the 
first row of Table 3, while for 
€ 
W PL and 
€ 
Π p
PL  we have to consider the values in the 
second row of Table 4.
iii)when 
€ 
c,λ( )∈ F1  and 
€ 
c > 1+ 2λ4 1+ λ( ) , the public firm does not produce in both 
Stackelberg equilibria. Then, the values of 
€ 
W GL , 
€ 
Π p
GL , 
€ 
W PL and 
€ 
Π p
PL  of interest are 
those in the second row of Tables 3 and 4. 
Applying the criterion (8), straightforward but tedious computations show the result. 
■
Proof of Theorem 10. In order to prove the result, we need to consider three cases: (i) 
Nash is the relevant equilibrium of the mixed duopoly; (ii) private leadership is the relevant 
equilibrium of the mixed duopoly with an interior solution; and (iii) private leadership  with 
the public firm not producing is the relevant equilibrium of the mixed duopoly.
(i)By point i) in Theorem 6 Nash is the relevant equilibrium of the mixed duopoly 
game when 
€ 
c,λ( )∈ ˆ F 2 . So, we have to compare 
€ 
W MN  from Table 2 with 
€ 
W CN  
(equation 10). It is easy to show that 
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€ 
W MN > W CN ∀ c,λ( )∈ ˆ F 2 .
(ii)By points ii) and iii) in Theorem 6, and Theorem 8 the Stackelberg outcome with 
the private firm as leader is the relevant SPE of the mixed duopoly  game when 
€ 
c,λ( )∈ F2 . Moreover, when 
€ 
c < λ3λ +1  the public firm produces positive quantity in 
the equilibrium. Then, we have to compare the value of 
€ 
W PL  in the first row of Table 
4 with 
€ 
W CN  (equation 10). Straightforward computations show that 
 
€ 
W PL >W CN ∀ c,λ( )∈ F2, c <
λ
3λ +1.
(iii)When 
€ 
c ≥ λ3λ +1 , the public firm does not produce in the private leadership 
equilibrium. Thus, we have to compare the value of 
€ 
W PL  in the second row of Table 4 
with 
€ 
W CN  (equation 10). It shows that 
 
€ 
W PL >W CN ∀ c,λ( )∈ F2, c >
λ
3λ +1.
■
Proof of Theorem 11. When the privatized firm achieves full efficiency gains, 
welfare after privatization is: 
  (13)
 In order to prove the result we have to distinguish between three cases as in Theorem 10.
(i)By point i) in Theorem 6 Nash is the relevant equilibrium of the mixed duopoly 
game when 
€ 
c,λ( )∈ ˆ F 2 . So, we have to compare 
€ 
W MN  from Table 2 with 
€ 
W CN  
(equation 13). Straightforward computations show that 
 
€ 
W MN ≥W CN
c =0
∀ c,λ( ) ∈ ˆ F 2, c <
31+ 2λ( )2 − 1+ 3λ( ) 2 3+ 8λ1+ λ( )⎛ ⎝ ⎜ ⎞ ⎠ ⎟ 
31+ λ( ) 3+ 8λ( ) .
 Thus, we can define the subset 
 
€ 
J1 = (c,λ) ∈ ˆ F 2 c <
31+ 2λ( )2 − 1+ 3λ( ) 2 3+ 8λ1+ λ( )⎛ ⎝ ⎜ ⎞ ⎠ ⎟ 
31+ λ( ) 3+ 8λ( )
⎧ 
⎨ 
⎪ 
⎩ ⎪ 
⎫ 
⎬ 
⎪ 
⎭ ⎪ 
.
 Referring to the definition of the subset 
€ 
ˆ F 2  in (12), it  is easy to check that 
€ 
J1  is a non-empty 
set.
(ii)By points ii) and iii) in Theorem 6, and Theorem 8 the private leadership 
equilibrium is the relevant  SPE of the mixed duopoly game when 
€ 
c,λ( )∈ F2 . 
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Moreover, when 
€ 
c < λ3λ +1  the public firm produces positive quantity in the 
equilibrium. Then, we have to compare the value of 
€ 
W PL  in the first row of Table 4 
with 
€ 
W CN  (equation 13). First of all, define 
 
€ 
F2a = (c,λ)∈ F2 |c <
λ
3λ +1
⎧ 
⎨ 
⎩ 
⎫ 
⎬ 
⎭ 
.
 It is easy to show that: 
 
€ 
W PL ≥W CN
c=0
 
€ 
∀ c,λ( )∈ F2a , 9c 2 1+ λ( )2 4 + 9λ( ) −18cλ 1+ λ( ) 2 + 3λ( ) + 4λ − 7λ3 > 0.
 Thus we can define the subset 
 
€ 
J2a = (c,λ)∈ F2a 9c 2 1+ λ( )2 4 + 9λ( ) −18cλ 1+ λ( ) 2 + 3λ( ) + 4λ − 7λ3 > 0{ }
 that is non-empty.
(iii)Defining 
 
€ 
F2b = (c,λ)∈ F2 |c ≥
λ
3λ +1,
⎧ 
⎨ 
⎩ 
⎫ 
⎬ 
⎭ 
the public firm does not  produce in the private leadership equilibrium. Then, we have to 
compare the value of 
€ 
W PL  in the second row of Table 4 with 
€ 
W CN  (equation 13). 
Straightforward computations show that  the subset  such that privatization reduces 
welfare is not empty: 
 
€ 
J2b = (c,λ)∈ F2b |c <
1
3 1− 2λ ⇔W
Pr L −W FE ≥ 0⎧ ⎨ 
⎩ 
⎫ 
⎬ 
⎭ 
.
Then, the subset of the space of parameters such that a full efficient privatization with 
full bargaining power to the government reduces welfare is the following: 
 
€ 
J = J1∪ J2a ∪ J2b .
■
Finally, we show the Tables 2, 3, and 4 that summarize the equilibrium outcome in the 
cases of: (i) simultaneous move game, (ii) public leadership, and (iii) private leadership.  
€ 
c + λ 1− 2c( )3λ +1( )
€ 
1+ λ( ) 1− 2c( )3λ +1( )
€ 
c + λ1+ c( )
3λ +1
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
2
−Kp
€ 
W MN
€ 
1− 2c 1+ λ( )1+ 2λ( )2 + c 2 1+ λ( )2 3+ 8λ( ) + 2λ 3+ λ 5 + λ( )⎛ ⎝ ⎜ ⎞ ⎠ ⎟ 
2 3λ +1( )2
− 1+ λ( )Kg −Kp
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Table 2: The mixed duopoly Nash equilibrium (MN) quantities, profits and welfare.
€ 
qpGL
€ 
qgGL
€ 
Π p
GL
€ 
c < 1+ 2λ4 1+ λ( )
€ 
2c 1+ λ( ) + λ
1+ 4λ( )
€ 
1+ 2λ( ) − 4c 1+ λ( )
1+ 4λ( )
€ 
2c 1+ λ( ) + λ( )2
1+ 4λ( )2
−Kp
€ 
c ≥ 1+ 2λ4 1+ λ( )
€ 
1
2
€ 
0
€ 
1
4 −Kp
€ 
W GL
€ 
c < 1+ 2λ4 1+ λ( )
€ 
1
2
4λ − 2c − 6cλ + 4c 2 + λ2 − 4cλ2 + 8c 2λ + 4c 2λ2 +1( )
1+ 4λ( )
− 1+ λ( )Kg −Kp
€ 
c ≥ 1+ 2λ4 1+ λ( )
€ 
3
8 − 1+ λ( )Kg −Kp
Table 3: The public leadership (GL) equilibrium quantities, profits and welfare.
€ 
qpPL
€ 
qgPL
€ 
Π p
PL
€ 
c < λ3λ +1
€ 
1
2
c + λ + cλ( )
λ
€ 
λ − c − 3cλ( ) 1+ λ( )
2λ 1+ 2λ( )
€ 
1
4
c + λ + cλ( )2
λ 2λ +1( )
−Kp
€ 
c ≥ λ3λ +1
€ 
1− c
€ 
0
€ 
c(1− c) −Kp
€ 
W PL
€ 
c < λ3λ +1
€ 
4λ − 4cλ + 4c2 + 8λ2 + λ3 − 10cλ2 + 17c2λ − 6cλ3 + 22c2λ2 + 9c2λ3( )
8 2λ + 1( )λ
− 1+ λ( )Kg − Kp
€ 
c ≥ λ3λ +1
€ 
1
2 −
1
2 c
2 − 1+ λ( )Kg −Kp
Table  4: The private leadership (PL) equilibrium values of quantities, profits and 
welfare.
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